In 1949 V.O. Key wrote about the importance of state-level "one-party systems" in the southern United States for organizing local authoritarian rule in a nationally competitive party system. 1 Key's study documented a phenomenon that continues to pose theoretical puzzles to contemporary scholarship on party systems: the simultaneous existence of competitive party politics and noncompetitive party politics in one national party system. In addition to documenting U.S. party system dynamics at the subnational level that were distinct from those at the national level, Key also uncovered important institutional interactions between noncompetitive state party systems and the competitive national party system. These findings (and many others that followed about U.S. state party politics) provided significant possibilities for theory building about parties and party systems. However, this theoretical promise was stifled by two subsequent developments in political science. The first was the impermeability of boundaries between American and comparative politics, which relieved Americanist scholars of the burdens of generalization and comparative theory builders of the burden of paying close attention to U.S evidence. The second was the theoretical development of comparative literatures on party systems, whose most influential scholars overlooked or rejected the incorporation of subnational contexts into their theorizing about party systems. As a result, scholars of American politics developed an extensive empirical literature on
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Key's study documented a phenomenon that continues to pose theoretical puzzles to contemporary scholarship on party systems: the simultaneous existence of competitive party politics and noncompetitive party politics in one national party system. In addition to documenting U.S. party system dynamics at the subnational level that were distinct from those at the national level, Key also uncovered important institutional interactions between noncompetitive state party systems and the competitive national party system. These findings (and many others that followed about U.S. state party politics) provided significant possibilities for theory building about parties and party systems. However, this theoretical promise was stifled by two subsequent developments in political science. The first was the impermeability of boundaries between American and comparative politics, which relieved Americanist scholars of the burdens of generalization and comparative theory builders of the burden of paying close attention to U.S evidence. The second was the theoretical development of comparative literatures on party systems, whose most influential scholars overlooked or rejected the incorporation of subnational contexts into their theorizing about party systems. As a result, scholars of American politics developed an extensive empirical literature on state party politics while comparative theorizing about parties and party systems remained oblivious to the theoretical implications of this trend.
Today there is new interest in how and why the quality of democracy varies across subnational territorial units of countries. 2 Party system dynamics are a crucial piece of the puzzle. However, the comparative literature on parties and party systems offers few theoretical tools to scholars interested in this topic. This is because in that theoretical tradition party systems are conceived of and measured nationally. Their systemic properties are assessed at the national level, and the indicators used to measure those properties are national (usually votes for national offices or seats in national legislatures). This practice has created a situation of conceptual and measurement incompleteness that hinders new discoveries in the study of party competition across jurisdictional boundaries of the nation-state.
As a corrective to this situation, this article reconceptualizes a party system that incorporates subnational party systems into the conceptual mapping of party politics. A large number of polities with federalized territorial structures possess subnational party systems that contain all the properties normally attributed to systems by social scientists. The party systems in such polities, which we label "federalized party systems," are characterized by distinctive patterns of party competition for subnational offices, be it for seats in provincial legislatures, control of municipalities, or control of executive positions for states, provinces, or autonomous regions. Party competition for such offices is also governed by constitutional arrangements or laws regulating elections and party competition whose scope is limited to the subnational territorial jurisdiction.
Theorization and measurement of party politics in federalized polities must thus start from a new conceptualization that sees their party systems as composed of both a national party subsystem and subnational party subsystems. 3 Subnational party systems are not only shapers of power in local politics. They also affect key outcomes in national party politics. A complete picture of the structure and dynamics of party competition in federalized polities must distinguish between these separate party subsystems or analyze the variations and interactions between them.
This article develops the federalized party system model, defining federalized party systems as those in which more than one territorially delimited party system operates. It presents a new metric, the "summary measure of congruence," that measures dispersion in patterns of electoral competition between national and subnational subsystems of a federalized party system.
The article then showcases the analytical usefulness of these contributions with an in-depth empirical analysis of one federalized party system, Argentina.
T heoretical Problems in the Study of Subnational Party Systems
The field of U.S. studies has a long tradition of scholarship on state-level party politics. Crossstate comparisons include such classic works as V. O. Key's study of southern political and party systems and Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall's study of party competition in several U.S.
states. 4 More recent works also compare contemporary patterns of state party organization, 5 as well as competition and party leadership behavior across U.S. states. 6 The bulk of these authors implicitly or explicitly recognize the empirical existence of party systems operating at the state level. However, the theoretical status of such systems remains undeveloped. Their systemic interactions with the national party system are largely unaddressed, and there are no efforts to pose questions about their dynamics within a national party system in ways that would travel beyond the U.S. case.
The comparative politics literature on parties in federal systems offers a far thinner array of studies of subnational party politics, but the patterns in this literature hew closely to those in the U.S. literature. Studies examine within-party dynamics, office seeker strategies, and competitive interactions patterns between parties at the local level. The empirical existence of subnational party systems is similarly recognized, but it is not a focus of theoretical explanation or analysis. Where subnational systems are addressed, the quest tends to be the idiographic explanation of their origins, structure, or dynamics.
Thus, in the American politics and comparative politics literature subnational party systems are recognized as a widespread empirical phenomenon, but this recognition has not been captured in theories of parties and party systems. In fact, the dominant theoretical literatures on party systems tend to treat subnational party systems much like unwelcome members of a club.
Their presence is grudgingly recognized, but no efforts are made to integrate them as fully equal members. The usual treatments are either to ignore them and deny their importance, or to address them inconsistently, acknowledging their existence and affiliation at some moments, but treating them as outsiders at other moments.
Both patterns are present in the party systems literature. Alan Ware is among the most direct. Writing on parties in federal regimes, he states that "in any federal country there may well be significant differences between the policies and interests represented by a party at the national level and those represented at the state level…But that does not mean that we should include patterns of state party systems in our classification of the national party system." 7 Ware thus acknowledges the existence of state party systems but refuses to grant them full membership in his classification of party systems. He justifies this subsequently with the assertion that they tend not to matter to the development of national party systems, although he offers no evidence on behalf of this assertion.
Giovanni Sartori, the most influential writer on party systems, handles subnational party systems similarly, with a reluctance to conceive of them as systems proper. 8 Subnational party systems fit uncomfortably in his theoretical party system scheme. This is reflected in the inconsistent treatment he gives them in the few pages devoted to them in his classic work on parties and party systems. The important point about Sartori's brief discussion of subnational party politics in federal countries is not that his arguments are invalid. It is that they are inconsistent. And this inconsistency is rooted in the fact that the theoretical apparatus he is working with, one which apprehends the systemic properties of party competition exclusively at the national level, fits poorly with the empirical world he is studying. It is a prominent example of the conceptual incompleteness that is endemic to the party systems literature, and that has hindered theoretical understanding of federalized political systems. 13 The solution is simple, and utilizes the very tools of systems analysis that underpin the theoretical literature on parties and party systems. It is a reconceptualization of party politics in federalized polities that incorporates subnational party systems into the conceptual mapping of party politics.
A Reconceptualization of Party Systems: T he Federalized Party System
The first step in developing this reconceptualization is to clarify our use of the term "system."
The properties of a system as an analytical tool vary widely across scientific disciplines, reflecting the numerous domains to which the concept has been applied. However, it is possible to provide a relatively precise definition of a system based on a few core properties. Robert
Jervis summarizes its defining characteristics: "We are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts." 14 To these defining properties we can add that a system must possess clear boundaries that permit us to distinguish the system from other entities with which it interacts. 15 Having a clear sense of the system's boundaries is crucial to assessing changes in its autonomy, or its subsystem autonomy if it operates in the context of a larger system. Subsystem autonomy is a critical variable property that shapes systemic disruption and evolution.
The step from an abstract definition of a system to a concrete definition of a party system is straightforward, and such definitions abound with considerable consistency in the party systems literature. All definitions, with minor modifications, agree that a party system can be seen as patterns of interaction and competition between political parties. 16 The primary units of the party system are the individual parties, whose identity and dynamics are separate from those of the system as a whole. Sartori writes that "a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition," and notes further that these interactions are "conducive to, and result from, subsystem autonomy."
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As demonstrated below, subnational party systems possess these very properties and should be given full membership in the conceptual realm of party systems scholarship. The "federalized party system" concept permits us to do that. In federalized polities, provinces or states possess political systems of their own, with varying degrees of subnational autonomy, political constitutions, and political offices that apply exclusively to subnational jurisdictions.
These subnational political systems also possess party systems of their own, with patterns of competition that are unique to them and that are shaped by the local institutional context in which they operate.
T he Federalized Party System Defined A federalized party system is one in which more than one territorially delimited party system operates. That is, in addition to the national party system, which is organized for the capture of national offices, a federalized party system contains subnational party systems organized for the capture of subnational offices. Their systemic properties may be congruent or incongruent with the format of the national party system. The federalized party system is displayed schematically in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 here]
The basic properties of a federalized party system are as follows:
1. Its primary internal units are national and subnational party subsystems.
2. The component parts of national or subnational party systems are political parties, and the boundaries are provided by the pattern of interaction between them.
3. National and subnational party systems operate within political systems that are distinct to each territorial level. A necessary condition for the existence of a subnational party system is the existence of local offices or legislative seats that are objects of competition between political parties. In addition, such competition is governed by local constitutions and/or electoral laws that are specific to the subnational jurisdiction. The degree to which local authorities can independently write local electoral laws is an important indicator of subsystem autonomy.
4. An individual party can (and often does) operate simultaneously in more than one party system. It can thus be a component part of separate and distinct patterns of interaction at the same moment in time.
5. Patterns of interaction between national and subnational party systems are conditioned by the specific institutional, material, and immaterial linkages between them. Individual political parties are the main institutional linkages between the national and subnational party subsystems.
Other possible linkages would include communication flows, resource flows, coalitions, and government institutions with jurisdiction over multiple territorial arenas. 6 . Transformations of subnational party systems follow a) changes endogenous to their own political system, and b) interaction with other party systems. Endogenous changes would generally involve (i) the electoral system, and (ii) the constitutional structure; exogenous changes would be conditioned by (iii) the degree of subsystem autonomy.
A Measure of Party Competition in Federalized Party Systems
One significant challenge to the study of federalized party systems is capturing and summarizing the variations in party competition between national and subnational party subsystems. To illustrate, Figure 2 presents visual displays of patterns of competition in Argentina, a party system that possess the properties we have attributed to federalized party systems. These are snapshot representations of "congruence" or "incongruence" in party competition between national and subnational party systems as measured by the effective number of parties competing for offices at each jurisdictional level in a particular year. We use the Laakso-Taagepera index for measuring the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) in a party system. 19 The elections being compared are for the presidency and provincial governorships. Our focus on executive elections allows us to keep the district size constant and therefore to control for the effects of district magnitude on the number of parties. The "summary measure of congruence" captures the average differences in effective numbers of parties between the national and subnational systems, as well as the variance between the subnational party systems themselves. Coefficients for each of these are displayed in Table 1 . The summary measure apprehends levels of congruence (closer to zero) and incongruence (far from zero). 21 [ Table 1 here]
The data reveal that the trend over time in Argentina's federalized party system has been a growing level of incongruence. The system was fairly congruent and stable in the first decade after the 1983 national transition to democracy. However, our measurement shows a marked shift toward incongruence in 1999. This was due primarily to changes at the provincial level, since, as can be seen in Figure 1 , the effective number of parties in the 1999 presidential election was fairly similar to those of the preceding contests. The trend toward incongruence intensified in 2003, and while much of this was due to greater variance between provinces, it was compounded by changes in national party competition. High levels of incongruence in Argentina's federalized party system continued into 2007.
In addition, our measures reveal that the evolution of Argentina's federalized party system toward incongruence was taking place as early as 1999. That the shifts at this time were being driven by subnational party system changes could not have been visible by observation and measure of the national party system alone. The reconceptualizations and measures we provide thus permit us to apprehend key transformations within party systems that would go unnoticed by those employing the national-centric measures that have dominated the comparative study of party systems and party system nationalization.
As demonstrated below, the rising levels of incongruence after this period resulted from action by local incumbents and party leaders taking advantage of the subsystemic autonomy of provincial political systems, to insulate their provinces from national competitive pressures. In selected provinces these actions resulted in shifts from competitive party politics to noncompetitive party politics. The case studies presented here reveal key mechanisms driving this phenomenon, as well as system-wide consequences.
Subnational Party Systems in A rgentina: Dynamics of Power and C hange
Argentina is a federal republic, with a presidential executive and a bicameral national legislature.
The country's twenty-four provincial districts enjoy considerable formal political autonomy. In the Argentine federal system, provincial politics is a major power base for national politicians. 23 Control over the provincial polity determines which politicians become influential within the national party, and grants membership in the gubernatorial coalitions that make or break presidential contenders. Until the 2007 elections, every president since 1989 (who served more than two days in office) has been a former governor or subnational chief executive.
Subnational E lections in A rgentina: Comparing G ubernatorial E lections with Provincial L egislative E lections Assessing the competitive state of subnational party politics in Argentina requires a deeper probe into the federalized party system. The frequency distributions for the twenty-year period provided in Table 2 contrast party dominance in gubernatorial races with party control of provincial legislative seats. They reveal interesting trends over time.
Gubernatorial elections are often observed to gauge local competitive patterns, and the data in Table 2 present a mixed view. Over this period Argentina's federalized party system was characterized mostly by competitive subnational party systems. On average, 84 percent of gubernatorial races were won with a small majority or plurality going to the first place party, [ Table 2 here]
The data reveal a varied competitive pattern of subnational party politics in Argentina. In some cases provincial politics mirror national competitive trends. In others they clearly do not.
Several provincial party systems are competitive and even fragmented. On the other hand, a significant number of provincial party systems present profiles that raise questions about their competitiveness, with some showing evidence of domination by a hegemonic provincial party.
Whether these patterns reflect actual restrictions on competition at the subnational level can only be determined through close observation of specific cases. Furthermore, any claim about the existence of subnational hegemonic party politics is a statement not only about structure and outcomes but also of intent. In Sartori's classification the key difference between a competitive party system and a hegemonic party system is one of design. In the latter systems electoral and political institutions that govern party interaction are intended by their designers to ensure the victory of the hegemonic party. 25 This intent can only be ascertained by observing the actors and processes that put those institutions in place. Therefore, this study turns from In 1994 Governor Kirchner availed himself of the Peronist legislative majority to enact a constitutional reform that permitted the reelection of the governor for two consecutive terms and introduced new gubernatorial powers to invoke plebiscites and referenda. Kirchner subsequently won reelection in 1995, and the PJ held onto its legislative majority. However, a continuing challenge for the Peronist party was the competitive nature of urban politics in the province. The
Radical Party won control of the provincial capital city in 1989, and over the years continued to consolidate its electoral strength in other urban municipalities as well.
As Governor Kirchner's second term in office approached its conclusion in 1998, he pushed for a second constitutional reform. Invoking his new plebiscitary powers, he organized a referendum to approve amendment of the provincial constitution. The "yes" position won with 57 percent of the vote, and led to the enactment of the 1999 provincial constitution. 27 Under the new constitution, which stands unmodified to this day, the governor is entitled to run for reelection without term limits. The electoral system for provincial deputies has also been changed, which has dealt effectively with the challenge by urban-based opposition parties.
The legislature is now elected under a mixed-member electoral system. Ten members are elected in a province-wide single district by a proportional representation formula (as before). The other fourteen are elected in single-member districts that represent each provincial department. One result of this combination of electoral rules is a majoritarian bias in the system. 28 However, more significant was the introduction of a marked partisan bias that favored the Peronist Party. The division of the province into fourteen districts generated a malapportionment of seats that overrepresented rural areas (PJ bastions) and underrepresented urban areas. As a result, Santa
Cruz is today the most malapportioned province in Argentina. 29 Twenty-eight percent of the population elects a majority in the legislature.
[ Figure 3 here] However, the PJ did not have the required supermajority in the lower chamber to call for a constitutional convention. In a dizzying series of maneuvers that ultimately led the Radicals to abstain in protest from elections to a constitutional convention, the PJ managed not only to pass the law mandating the constitutional reform but also to control 100 percent of seats at the convention charged with drafting the new constitution. 32 Holding a monopoly at the convention, the PJ was able to obtain the indefinite reelection of the governor. The constitutional reform also increased the number of deputies in the lower house, and the convention members charged the provincial legislature with designing a proportional representation method for electing these deputies after the constitutional convention. The design was breathtakingly Machiavellian. The Peronist-controlled legislature produced a proportional representation system for the distribution of minority party seats, but retained the supermajoritarian prize of 60 percent of the seats for the first place party. In this way opposition parties were dealt a double blow. The supermajoritarian bias of the previous system was retained, favoring the first place party. And the new proportional representation distribution formula for minority parties further divided potential opposition challenges to the Peronist party. 33 The 1989 midterm elections gave 64 percent of lower chamber seats (with 51 percent of the popular vote) and 88 percent of senate seats to the PJ. were implicated in a grisly and complex case involving the rape and murder of a young girl. In the face of local judicial inaction, provincial civil society reacted fiercely, organizing mass demonstrations that drew national attention. Seizing the opportunity created by the local crisis, the central government used its legal powers to break the autonomy of the provincial political system and ordered a federal takeover of all branches of the provincial government.
The federal intervention in Catamarca dismantled the institutional arrangements that gave the Saadi family control over the provincial political system. National authorities repealed the institutional rules that secured supermajoritarian control of the legislature. They also changed the electoral system for provincial deputies to a real proportional representation system to ensure a fairer allocation of seats between parties. In addition, federal officials decreed the expiration of all elective and judicial mandates, as well as the reform of the provincial administration and the police force that had buttressed the Saadi family's power.
34 Figure 4 shows the impact of the federal intervention's reforms on competitive dynamics in Catamarca. A competitive party system has resulted from the abrupt loss of subsystem autonomy suffered by the provincial party system. Since 1991 the province has been governed by a front composed of the UCR, an anti-Saadi Peronist Party faction, and other forces. They have not changed the electoral system or reformed the provincial constitution.
[ Figure 4 here] These Argentine provincial case studies establish that, against the assumptions of party systems theorists, noncompetitive party subsystems can exist alongside competitive national and subnational party subsystems. They also highlight this as one notable feature of Argentina's federalized party system. Furthermore, the case studies reveal that the competitive dynamics of such systems can change, and that change is driven both by endogenous dynamics and interaction with other units of the federalized party system. This analysis shows that the three components of our modified version of Sartori's transformation rules for party systems gave considerable analytical leverage for fleshing out these dynamics of change. Changes in provincial constitutional structure and electoral systems by local power holders shifted the competitive dynamics of subnational party systems. The degree of subsystem autonomy of the provincial party system helped shape the permanence or discontinuity of these shifts.
Conclusion
"Hegemony is incubated from below" Natalio Botana 35 Theory has been slow in catching up to mounting evidence that subnational party systems are important to power and competition in federalized polities. Such polities have long been illserved by whole-nation biases in the party systems literature that conceive and measure party systems in national terms, and that erase subnational party systems from the conceptual mapping of party politics.
Reconceptualizing party systems in federalized polities makes the theoretical and comparative analysis of subnational party politics possible using analytical tools of the literature on parties and party systems. The concept of federalized party system denotes one in which more than one territorially delimited party system operates. In addition to the national party system, which is organized for the capture of national offices, a federalized party system contains subnational party systems organized for the capture of subnational offices. A full understanding of party competition in federalized party systems thus requires consideration of these separate party subsystems, as well as the interactions between them.
Potentially varied competitive scenarios in federalized polities when subnational party systems are accounted for can be measured to indicate those patterns and to enhance crossnational comparison. The case of Argentina provides a closer look at the structure of a federalized party system, its systemic dynamics, and patterns of change. It also suggests that the study of subnational party systems is relevant not only for learning about subnational politics but also for understanding important outcomes in national party systems.
The reason for this is system effects. In Argentina success in provincial party politics helped launch the governor of a remote and small province to the national presidency. Control of a polity of 200,000 people and an infinitesimal share of the national GDP would not by themselves have made such an outcome likely. Governor Kirchner's national success was due to the system effects of the federalized polity, which magnified his influence and projected him onto the national stage. The same can be said for recent predecessors from small provincesCarlos Saúl Menem (ex-governor of La Rioja province), who served as President from 1989 to 1999; and Adolfo Rodríguez Sáa (ex-governor of San Luis province), who served briefly as president in early 2002. 36 Such is the case in many federalized polities, where system effects make subnational party systems forgers of national leaders and shapers of power in national party systems. This makes the study of subnational party politics all the more pressing as we seek to understand the dynamics and quality of democratic politics in federalized polities.
Writing about the current empirical universe of party systems and its implications for future research, Peter Mair noted a narrowing of competitive scenarios and their clustering around a particular pattern. He wrote that, in an era in which "two-party systems in a strict sense are hard to find, and if examples of polarized pluralism are also thin on the ground, then, perforce, most systems tend to crowd into the category of moderate pluralism." 37 If we expand our conceptual lens to the subnational level, however, this assessment no longer holds true. A far wider array of competitive scenarios becomes available for analysis, and our understanding of party systems and politics in democratic regimes becomes greatly enriched. This article identifies one scenario, the subnational hegemonic party, a finding that suggests that the long moribund field of study of hegemonic party systems is more relevant to the study of contemporary democratic politics in many countries than national-centric approaches would reveal. New light on other phenomena, such the anti-system effects of regional parties, ecological determinants of party alignments, or the coexistence of polarized and moderate competitive patterns within federalized polities, may also lead scholars to reconsider how party systems are structured and changed over time. Subnational party systems have long been condemned to obscurity and isolation by the theoretical approaches of our discipline. Revising those approaches offers promising possibilities for uncovering new and complex institutional realities in contemporary party politics.
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